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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, DECEMBER 2, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-116.

2. (U) Meeting Date: December 2, 2009
Time: 4:05 P.M. to 5:05 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (S) This was the third meeting to discuss telemetry provisions to be included in the START Follow-on (SFO treaty). The U.S. side requested the meeting to present and discuss a new proposal the United States had provided earlier in the day to Ambassador Antonov that built on the recently-provided Russian-proposed treaty text. Mr. Siemon walked through the proposal and the Russian delegation asked a number of questions to clarify its understanding. Gen Poznikhir restated the Russian-proposed concept for inclusion of a single paragraph in Treaty Article X and the reasons the Russian delegation found the U.S. proposal unacceptable. End Summary.

4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Discussing the U.S. Proposal; Why the Flight Test Proposal Won't Fly; The Russian Alternative; and Reporting Out.

DISCUSSING THE U.S. PROPOSAL

¶5. (S) Mr. Siemon explained to Gen Poznikhir that he called this meeting to review and discuss a new U.S.-proposed formulation for the treaty article and part of the protocol containing provisions for the exchange of telemetry data, which expanded on a Russian-proposed treaty text. Siemon walked through the text of the proposal, covering the two paragraphs of the treaty text, the six paragraphs of the part of the protocol, and the associated notification.

¶6. (S) Siemon noted the proposal contained many provisions which were similar to START and the previously-provided U.S. proposals. He clarified that he had been given the flexibility to offer up to seven encrypted flight tests each year, with no more than two of those being ICBM or prototype ICBM flights and no more than two SLBM or prototype SLBM flights. He also noted the importance of recording the basic set of Telemetry Provisions in the telemetry part of the protocol. Including these provisions in the protocol would provide basic guidelines to the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) for defining more detailed procedures while giving the sides the opportunity to discuss them and make needed viability and effectiveness changes without having to go through a re-ratification process in the Senate and the Duma.

¶7. (S) Poznikhir commented that the Russian delegation had read the recent U.S. proposal and compared it with the Russian-proposed treaty text and previous U.S. proposals. He noted that in the Russian view the United States was basically proposing the same thing as it had previously

proposed but in a different form, and that it was taking the basic Russian proposal for a paragraph in the treaty and expanding it. He stated that this was not acceptable--a change of form was not a change of content.

¶8. (S) Poznikhir noted two substantive changes that the Russian delegation had observed--one was the lack of a restriction on transmitting information from the re-entry vehicle as had been the case in START and in previous proposals, and the second was a lowering of the allowable number of encrypted flight tests per year from 11 under START to 4 in the new proposal. Siemon replied that the intention was to continue the restriction on encryption of re-entry vehicle data and that it would be included in the annex. He also reiterated his new instructions which gave him the flexibility to increase the number of encrypted flight tests to seven.

WHY THE FLIGHT TEST PROPOSAL WON'T FLY

¶9. (S) Poznikhir repeated that the U.S. proposal was not acceptable and asked for answers to questions raised in the Russian package deal and previous telemetry discussions concerning data from UK Trident II flight tests and the use of Russian flight test data in enhancing U.S. missile defense systems. Siemon replied that these matters had been discussed before (Refs A and B). While there was no formal response from the United States yet, he reminded Poznikhir that he had asked about the possibility of a bilateral statement on the use of flight test data for missile defense. He again noted the United States was not in a position to make commitments for the United Kingdom in a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia, but the U.S. delegation had conducted an initial discussion with UK representatives.

¶10. (S) Poznikhir restated that he did not wish to discuss the U.S. proposal and that it was unacceptable. The Russian position was that its paragraph of treaty text was all it was asking for--anything beyond that was viewed as unacceptable. He asked how the United States would envision the terms "parity" and "mutual agreement" from the first paragraph being applied in this treaty. Siemon replied that all of the provisions in the U.S. draft would apply equally to both Parties.

¶11. (S) Poznikhir pointed to the provisions for encrypting two ICBM and two SLBM flights and asked whether a decision by Russia to conduct 10 flights in a particular year would require discussion in the BCC. When Siemon replied that the limit would be seven encrypted flight tests, Poznikhir noted that the Russian proposal would allow four encrypted flights of each type each year. Siemon remarked that Presidents Obama and Medvedev had discussed telemetry during a Monday telephone conversation. President Obama commented that the impact of nine types of missiles at four flights per year for each type would be 36 encrypted flight tests allowed each year. President Medvedev replied that the number of encrypted flight tests in a given year should be four. Poznikhir disagreed, stating that the Russian President was supposed to have read their proposal word-for-word, but that he had not received a debrief on the Presidential telephone call.

THE RUSSIAN ALTERNATIVE

¶12. (S) Poznikhir stated that the reason for the Russian formulation of the treaty text was that the Russian side was trying to get the treaty signed on time. It had instructions from its President to record the obligation in the treaty in the first paragraph and deal with all other provisions later. If agreement to exchange data was in the treaty text, all other details could be resolved in the BCC. He went on to insist on their proposal as the only way, with 3 days remaining in the negotiations the Parties could come to resolution.

¶13. (S) When Siemon replied that it was necessary to have a treaty article that established the commitment for the exchange of telemetry data, Poznikhir stated the Russian proposal was intended to be that treaty article. Siemon replied there was also the need for a protocol with enough substance for the Parties to understand their obligations--the basic number of flight tests that would be encrypted with the commitment to provide specific details in the annex. The protocol would provide guidelines to develop the information in the annex. Both the treaty and protocol would be signed by the U.S. and Russian Presidents. Once signed and ratified, the articles in the treaty could not be easily changed without going back for re-ratification but the protocol could be changed if necessary for viability and effectiveness reasons. Siemon stated that when Gottemoeller and Antonov had met on the morning of December 2 and discussed the U.S.-proposed language for Article X of the treaty, Antonov's initial reaction was that it appeared to be workable text.

¶14. (S) Poznikhir admitted he had not discussed the matter with Antonov after his most recent meeting with Gottemoeller but Poznikhir's own opinion was that the U.S. proposal was simply a rewritten version of its previous proposals in different form and, therefore, it was unacceptable. While the United States had taken the Russian-proposed treaty paragraph to start its proposal, it changed one very important word--from "The Parties may exchange" to "The Parties shall exchange"--and changed the meaning completely. The words as stated in the Russian proposal were the words of their President and they had no right to change those words.

¶15. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether the U.S. proposal intended to include reentry vehicle or front section data when it referred to the exchange of "all telemetric information" or whether the exclusions of START were to be continued. Siemon assured him the same exclusions as were in START on the broadcast of data and the provision of interpretive data for re-entry vehicle information were intended.

¶16. (S) Zaitsev asked whether the previously-discussed U.S. telemetry proposal had been removed. Siemon said that the current proposal was the only one now on the table and he

clarified that the proposal looked much like the original U.S. proposal. Poznikhir suggested the U.S. delegation go back and consider the Russian proposal of including one paragraph in the treaty and then coming to terms on the detailed provisions after treaty signature.

¶17. (S) Ryzhkov commented that all of the U.S. telemetry proposals could have been xeroxed from the START text. If Russia had wanted that, it would have agreed long ago. His belief was that the appropriate verification regime was still developing for both Parties and this should be worked out in ongoing discussions.

¶18. (S) Poznikhir reiterated that none of the parameters of START requiring telemetry for verification were included in the START Follow-on treaty. The Russian side had repeatedly stressed that the exchange of telemetry data was unacceptable and Poznikhir believed Gen Makarov had reinforced that message in his discussions with Adm Mullen. Poznikhir believed that it could take a very long time to come to terms, so the sides should accept the idea of a single paragraph in the treaty, work together on the phrasing, and move everything else to future discussions. Siemon stated that was not acceptable to the United States but that he would report the Russian position to the U.S. delegation and to Washington; Poznikhir said he would do the same on his side.

¶19. (S) Ryzhkov asked what types of information, including missile parameters and other telemetry data, the U.S. envisioned exchanging under this treaty. Siemon replied it would be the basic telemetry data similar to START, with interpretive data. The protocol would provide the format and the details would be negotiated in the annex. He envisioned an exemption for encryption on 7 flight tests, lower than the limit of 11 on START, but the types of missiles on which encryption would be used was much broader than in START.

¶20. (S) Poznikhir asked what would be exchanged in terms of flight test data. Siemon replied that both sides could determine what they would broadcast and, just as it had been done in START, the exchange would be based on the data that was broadcast. The proposal read "an agreed amount" so the volume and content could be discussed, decisions made, and agreement reached in the negotiation of the annex.

REPORTING OUT

¶21. (S) Siemon summarized what he would report on the Russian position. He clarified that the Russian delegation did not believe telemetry was necessary for verification of the treaty. The Russian concept was to include a small but direct paragraph in the treaty stating that the Parties "may" exchange telemetric information based on parity. The Russian intent was to agree on the type of data exchange within the framework of the BCC. Poznikhir made one addition--the Parties did not have to agree on what the protocol would contain. His view was that the treaty would be signed, the sides would then come to terms on the protocol, and then the rest would be worked out through the BCC. Siemon stated the U.S. position was that the treaty and protocol would be signed at the same time by the U.S. and Russian Presidents, the annex would be agreed later, but not signed by the Presidents; however, all three documents or tiers would be part of the package for ratification.

¶22. (S) Siemon concluded the sides were at an impasse on telemetry.

¶23. (U) Documents provided: None.

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon
Mr. Engelhardt
Ms. Pura
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir
Ge Orlov

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko

Col.Voloskov
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Pogodin (Int)

124. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS